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tral judge between the plaintiff and defendant, and eliminates the
ancient right which the plaintiff had to direct the sheriff to seize a
chattel from the defendant. 61
The court also rejected the defendant's reliance on Laprease on
the ground that specialized property was involved there. The heavy
duty equipment, which was the basis of the contract, was not considered "necessary for day to day living, the taking of which will impose tremendous hardship on the defendant ....-162 The court found
that there was probable cause for the order of seizure and ordered the
defendant's president to appear for an examination as to the location
of the goods.
The amended statute will probably continue to withstand constitutional challenges, despite its faults. It is, for example, overbroad
on its face since there are no suggested guidelines regarding issuance
of orders of seizure. The only consideration which the statute mentions
is that the order should not violate the debtor's right to due process.
The Legislature has permitted the courts to decide, on a case-by-case
basis, (1) what types of property are specialized and (2) when a proper
situation for issuing an order of seizure exists. Dean McLaughlin eloquently summarized this problem by stating that
[t]he cardinal flaw of the new legislation is its Olympian generality,
for it says little other than that a judge may sign an order permitting the seizure of a chattel whenever it would be constitutional to
do so. 1' s
CPLR 7102: Equipment utilized in business deemed "specialized property."
As a consequence of the tremendous increase in consumer credit,
the remedies of replevin and attachment have been the subject of frequent judicial concern. The decisional vanguard of this movement is
Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.'6 Therein, the United States
Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a Wisconsin statute' 65 which
161 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 7102, supp. commentary at 114 (1971). For a further discussion of the New York replevin statute, see The Quarterly Survey, 46 ST. JOHN'S L. REv.
355, 379 (1971).
162 68 Misc. 2d at 479, 326 N.Y.S.2d at 902. But see Cedar Rapids Engineering Co. v.
Haenelt, 68 Misc. 2d 206, 326 N.Y.S.2d 653 (Sup. Ct. Sullivan County 1971), where it was
held that the seizure of tools and equipment used by the debtor to earn money was the
specialized type of property contemplated by Laprease and its progenitor, Sniadach v.
Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
163 7B McKINNEY' CPLR 7102, supp. commentary at 114 (1971).
164 395 US. 337 (1969).
165 WIs. STAT. ANN. §§ 267.01-.24 (Supp. 1971). The sections overturned were §§ 267.04(1),
267.07(1), and 267.18(2)(a).
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permitted the prejudgment attachment of a debtor's wages without
notice or a hearing. Since wages were deemed "a specialized type of
property"'01 6 the taking of which may cause great personal hardship, the
summary procedure was held violative of due process. The Court noted,
however, that "[s]uch ...

procedure may well meet the requirements

167
of due process in extraordinary situations."'
The question now arising is what type of property is specialized
and therefore requires an extraordinary situation before it can be replevied?0 s Sniadach did not answer this question. The trend in New
York, as in other jurisdictions, has been to liberally construe the phrase,
"specialized property."'169
The most recent New York case to deal with this question is
Cedar Rapids Engineering Co. v. Haenelt170 The defendant purchased
certain machinery, tools, and equipment from the plaintiff for use in
his business. As security for two promissory notes, the defendant entered
into a conditional sales contract which provided that in the event of
default the plaintiff could repossess the chattels without notice.
Subsequently alleging that the defendant had defaulted, the plaintiff
obtained an order of seizure without notice under CPLR 7102. After
the sheriff seized the goods, the defendant sought to have the New
York replevin statute, article 71 of the CPLR, declared unconstitutional. The court held that the statute is not unconstitutional on its

face, citing Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co., 17 1 which held por-

tions of the former New York replevin statute unconstitutional. The
court therein deemed the specialized property concept enunciated in
166 595 U.S. at 340.
167 Id. at 559. For example, in Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc,, 339 U.S. 594
(1950), the Court allowed multiple seizures of a misbranded vitamin product based on
public health considerations. Also, in Fahey v. Mallonee, 832 U.S. 245 (1947), the Court
decided that an appointment of a conservator to take possession of a savings and loan
association without notice was not violative of due process. The Court declared that
the delicate nature of the institution and the impossibility of preserving credit
during an investigation has made it an almost invariable custom to apply supervisory authority in this summary manner.
Id. at 253.
There are other situations which would conceivably warrant seizure without notice,
for example, "a serious risk of damage to or removal of the property from the state ......
7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 7102, supp. commentary at 115 (1971).
168 See Note, ProvisionalRemedies in New York Reappraised Under Sniadach v. Family
Finance Corp.: A Constitutional Fly in the Creditor's Ointment, 34 ALBANY L. REv. 426,
433 (1970); Note, Some Implications of Sniadach, 70 CoLuMn. L. Rev. 942 (1970); Note, The
Supreme Court, 1968 Term, 83 HAav. L. REv. 7, 117 (1969).
109 See, e.g., Randone v. Appellate Dep't of the Superior Ct. of Sacramento County,
5 Cal. 3d 536, 488 P.2d 13, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1971); Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 486
P.2d 1242, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1971); The Quarterly Survey, 46 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 355, 379
(1971).
170 68 Misc. 2d 206, 226 N.Y.S.2d 653 (Sup. Ct. Sullivan County 1971).
171 315 F. Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y. 1971).
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Sniadach to include "[b]eds, stoves, mattresses, dishes, tables and other
necessaries for ordinary day-to-day living ....1

2

As a result, the statute

was defective as overbroad in that it did not limit the confiscation of
special property to extreme situations. Since Laprease, the situation
has been remedied by amendment. Based on these amendments, the
court in Cedar Rapids found the statute to be constitutional. Turning
to the question whether the statute was unconstitutionally applied, the
court acknowledged that "the pivotal determination is whether the
property seized by the plaintiff was special property within the meaning
of Sniadach and Laprease."'7 3 It then decided that "[t]here is no appreciable difference, if any, among the seizure of the tools and equipment whereby a party earns money, the seizure of wages, or the seizure
of household necessities."'1 4 Finding no extreme circumstances, the
court declared that the statute was unconstitutionally applied, and it
vacated the order of replevin.
Another New York case which the court relied on was Finkenberg
FurnitureCorp. v. Vasquez,'7 5 which held that a television, a five-piece
bedroom set, and a mattress and spring were specialized property within
the meaning of Sniadach and Laprease.
In Cedar Rapids, it is noteworthy that the court struck down the
plaintiff's actions even though they were in accordance with the terms
of the written contract of sale. Apparently, the overriding consideration was the fact that specialized property was involved. This can be
illustrated by a comparison between the CedarRapids case and Fuentes
v.Faircloth,'7 6 which also involved a conditional sales contract which
included a provision authorizing the creditor to repossess the goods
sold upon a default in payment. Mrs. Fuentes fell behind in her payments, and the defendants, under Florida's replevin statute,1'7 7 repossessed the property without notice. Denying relief, the court stated
"that . . .there are still situations in which prejudgment seizures of

goods without a prior hearing is [sic] valid... ,"178 one being where the
seller repossesses "pursuant to a contract which authorizes a conditional
172 Id. at

722.

173 68 Misc. 2d at 210, 526 N.Y.S.2d at 657.
174 Id.

175 67 Misc. 2d 154, 324 N.Y.S.2d 840 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1971), discussed in
The Quarterly Survey, 46 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 355, 383 (1971).
176 317 F. Supp. 954 (S.D. Fla. 1970), prob. juris. noted, 401 US. 906 (1971). For a
discussion of Fuentes, see Comment, Laprease and Fuentes: Replevin Reconsidered, 71
COLUM. L. REv. 886, 892 (1971).
177FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 78.01-.21 (Supp. 1971). The sections challenged were §§ 78.01,
78.04, 78.07, 78.08, 78.10, 78.11, and 78.12.
178 317 F. Supp. at 958.
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seller to repossess in order to protect his security interest .... ,'179 This
decision, however, was premised upon the fact that specialized property
was not involved. The court deemed Sniadach "a unique case involving,
'a specialized type of property presenting distinct problems in our economic system... '" and reasoned that it was in no way comparable
to a case involving enforcement of a security interest. 8 0
It appears that New York courts have in effect treated as special
property much of the property specifically exempted from money judgments under CPLR 5205.81 This trend is praiseworthy since exempt
property is the type of property deprivation of which would cause the
most serious hardship. Some critics have claimed that the type of property is immaterial and that "[a]ny deprivation of property without
notice and the chance to be heard is a denial of procedural due process."' 81 2 Judicial acceptance of this view is doubtful as indicated by
the fact that some courts have refused to apply the philosophy of
8 3
Sniadach to commercial situations.
CPLR 7102: Contract provision giving creditor the right to seize "specialized property" deemed unconscionable.
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Sniadach v. Family Finance
Corp.,8 4 there has been a plethora of decisions concerning the right of
a creditor to take possession of a debtor's property by means of a prejudgment order of replevin without notice and an opportunity to be
heard. Whether this procedure is constitutional depends in large part
upon the type of property that is seized.8 5 If sequestering the property
179 Id. Other courts have questioned whether such a contractual provision constitutes
a competent waiver of constitutional rights. See, e.g., Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co.,
315 F. Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y. 1970); Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 486 P.2d 1242, 96 Cal.

Rptr. 42 (1971).

180 Id. at 957, citing Brunswick Corp. v. J&P, Inc., 424 F.2d 100, 105 (10th Cir. 1970).
1SThe exempt personal property under CPLR 5205 includes household goods and

furniture, stoves, and necessary working tools and instruments below statutory values.
182 Note, Forcible Prejudgment Seizures, 25 Sw. L.J. 331, 338 (1971).

183 See, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. J&P, Inc., 424 F.2d 100 (10th Cir. 1970), where the

court upheld an order of seizure based on the fact that it was a commercial contract and
that the property repossessed was not special. But, is it not possible that the taking of
one's means of earning a living, even pursuant to a commercial contract, would cause just

as much hardship as the garnishment of wages? See Cedar Rapids Engineering Co. v.
Haenelt, 68 Misc. 2d 206, 326 N.Y.S.2d 653 (Sup. Ct. Sullivan County 1971).
184 995 U.S. 337 (1969).
185 The statute must be narrowly drawn so that the prejudgment taking of necessaries
without notice and a hearing is limited to extreme situations. See Laprease v. Raymours
Furniture Co., 315 F. Supp. 716, 723 (N.D.N.Y. 1970).
Overbreadth has recently caused sections 9503 and 9504 of the California Commercial
Code (sections 9-503 and 9-504 of the Uniform Commercial Code) to be declared unconstitutional as a taking of property without due process of law. Adams v. Egley, 40 U.S.L.W.

